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Recognition of reserve values 
in the extractive industries. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
An issue that focuses clearly on the difference between market and book 
values is accounting for reserves in the extractive industries.  The 
primary determinant of the value of a minerals or oil and gas producer is 
the value of the reserves that the firm controls. Hence, one might expect 
that managers acting to maximize the value of the firm would try to 
account for the value of reserves in a credible way. However, we show 
in this paper that financial statement recognition of reserve values is 
rare.  We survey the frequency of reserve value disclosures and related 
accounting procedures. We review the reasons for the general reluctance 
to recognize reserve values in financial statements and outline the few 
exceptions where the value of reserves is recognized. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
While the quality of financial statements has been debated over a long period, the 
issue has more recently become formalized due to the frustrations of researchers 
trying to measure the relation between financial statements and share prices (Lev, 
1989, 1997).  Among other concerns, the “market to book” ratio of listed companies 
is at a historical high.  This has caused researchers and policymakers to consider 
what aspects of firm value are not directly reflected in financial statements, and 
whether regulatory reforms can be initiated to make financial statements more fully 
reflective of the economic value of firms  (Wallman, 1996). 
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One issue that focuses clearly on the difference between market and book values is 
accounting for reserves in the extractive industries.  There are a number of reasons 
why the market to book ratios in these industries are usually greater than one, 
including options on exploration leases, proprietary technology, the existence of 
forward sales contracts, and so on.  However an important determinant of the value 
of a minerals or oil and gas producer is the value of the reserves that the firm 
controls.  Consistent with this, a number of U.S. based research studies have 
confirmed the positive effect of reserve value disclosures in annual reports on share 
prices (Bell, 1983; Doran, Collins and Dhaliwal, 1988) and bid-ask spreads (Raman 
and Tripathy, 1993).  Furthermore, Aboody (1996) shows that the market reacts 
differentially to recognition versus disclosure of reserve values in the US Oil and 
Gas industry.  Hence, one might expect that managers acting to maximize the value 
of the firm would try to account for the value of reserves in a credible way. 
 
 However, we show in this paper that financial statement recognition of reserve 
values by Australian firms is rare.  We survey the frequency of reserve value 
disclosures and related accounting procedures. Despite frequent disclosures of 
reserve quantities, we show that very few firms recognize reserve values in financial 
statements, and no firms disclose without recognizing reserve values.  We review the 
reasons for the general reluctance to recognize reserve values in financial statements 
and outline the few exceptions where the value of reserves is recognized.  Finally, 
we propose (but do not empirically confirm) reasons why firms are unlikely to 
disclose or recognize reserve values. 
 
 
2.  Regulatory background 
 
The asset we consider is "proved or probable reserves".  The Corporations Law in 
Australia requires neither disclosure nor financial statement recognition of the 
quantum or the value of reserves.  The Australian Stock Exchange listing rules (rules 
4 to 12 of Section 3M) state that where a company reports on the progress of any 
geological survey, such report shall comply with the requirements of the Australasian 
Institute of Mining and Metallurgy Code for Reporting of Identified Mineral 
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Resources and Ore Reserves. However, the ASX listing rules apply to information 
furnished to the Exchange only; the rules do not extend to the disclosure in the firm's 
annual report. The minimum requirements of disclosure in the annual report are laid 
down by Corporations Law and not the ASX.  In other words, disclosure of either or 
both quantities and values of proved reserves in the firms' annual report is voluntary. 
 
While regulations do not directly prevent managers from disclosing reserve values, 
recognition in balance sheets is hindered by accounting rules.  Strict adherence to 
historical cost procedures precludes recognition of the value of reserves unless they 
are recently purchased, rather than discovered and developed. Nevertheless, 
Australian accounting rules do provide managers of firms in the extractive industries 
with options to recognize values on balance sheets.  AASB 1010: Revaluation of 
Non-current Assets permits revaluation of reserves up to their recoverable amount.  
However, the revaluation increment is credited directly to an asset revaluation 
reserve; hence the revaluation increment does not increase income.  Furthermore, 
under current rules the increment cannot generally be transferred to income at some 
later point, such as during production, therefore the decision to recognize the value 
of reserves on the balance sheet of a producer permanently reduces income. 
 
While the same is true of asset revaluation procedures in other industries, the 
precluding of the credit  “ever” getting to income may be more of a disincentive to 
revalue reserves than non-current assets in other industries.  This is because such 
values are the primary determinant of the cost of inventory of extractive materials 
produced.  To illustrate, the decision to revalue property by a manufacturer does not 
preclude the manufacturer reporting profits on the sale of manufactured goods.  
However, where an extractive industries firm makes precisely accurate estimates of 
future costs and uses them on an undiscounted basis to revalue mineral reserves, 
under general conditions this will imply that reported profit from the eventual sale of 
extracted material is zero. 
 
The accounting standard on revaluations permits, but does not require, discounting 
to determine recoverable amount.  However, if a firm does discount future cash 
flows to determine the value of reserves to be recognized, this will permit profits to 
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be subsequently recognized, because the amount of net cash flows in subsequent 
periods will be greater than the net present value at the time of the revaluation.  (In a 
formal sense, the difference is the interest component).  Nevertheless, even if 
discounting is used profits will be lower if reserve values are recognized than if they 
are not, because the revaluation increment is taken directly to asset revaluation 
reserve. 
 
Managers are likely to prefer to report higher income from their operations for a 
number of reasons.  For example, it is likely to reduce the costs of contracting with 
lenders because income based covenants are used in debt contracts.  Reporting 
higher income is also likely to reduce the costs of contracting with shareholders, 
because income forms an important part of earnings based managerial bonus 
schemes.  Furthermore, positive income is used to signal/communicate with the 
market, as valuation models used by analysts include earnings as an important input. 
 We stress that while managers are likely to prefer to report higher income, this is 
not always the case. There are less frequent situations where managers prefer lower 
profits, including conditions of high political costs and where contracts provide 
incentives for mangers to “take a bath” by over-expensing (see Whittred, Zimmer 
and Taylor, 1997, chapter 2). 
 
Given the preference for reporting higher income, it is perhaps expected that the 
majority of producing firms in the extractive industries prefer not to recognize 
reserve values.  Nevertheless, a small number of Australian producers do exercise 
this “recognition option”.  In the rest of this paper we outline the producers that do 
recognize reserve values, report on why the managers of these firms claim to take 
this choice, and review possible determinants of the choice from the literature. Our 
purpose in focusing on these firms is to determine under what conditions firms will 
exercise the recognition option.  This in turn may permit a review of rules that could 
reduce the differences between book and market values.  In view of the small 
number of firms involved, we do not formally develop nor test hypotheses. 
 
 
3. Outline of firms that recognize values.    
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We collected a sample of Australian producer firms for the 1995 year.  The sample 
was selected by obtaining Jobson's Mining Yearbook 1995/96 and identifying all 
producers listed.  This amounted to 159 firms.  After deletion of foreign firms (20), 
an incomplete annual report (1) and those for which annual reports were not 
available (10), 128 firms remained.  Annual reports for the majority of firms are 
available on the Australian Graduate School of Management database.  Others were 
requested directly from the firms.  Table 1 outlines sample selection procedures.   
 
Table 1 
Selection of a sample of producers in the extractive industries in 1995 
Detail Number 
Firms listed in Jobson's Mining Yearbook 1995/96 489 
Firms identified as producers 159 
Less: Foreign companies (20) 
Less: Incomplete report (1) 
Less: Annual reports unavailable (10) 
= Number of firms in the sample 128 
 
 
We inspected financial statements for evidence of accounting for reserve values for 
the previous three years.  We found that only a small minority of firms (6) 
recognized reserve values in their balance sheets during this period.  Furthermore, no 
other firm made disclosures of reserve values elsewhere in the financial report.  Five 
of the firms are miners, one produces oil and gas.  A profile of the firms that 
recognize reserve values with a comparison to the entire sample of producers is 
shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 
Profile of producers in the extractive industries  
that recognize reserves’ value in 1995 
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Name 
 
Product 
 
Percentage 
of revenue 
from 
mining 
activity 
 
Market 
capitalization 
 
Size 
(Total 
assets) 
 
Leverage 
(excluding 
reserve 
values) 
 
Leverage 
(including 
reserve 
values) 
 
Reserves’ 
value 
CSR Ltd Quarries 
and 
bauxite 
6%* $4419m $7174m 0.55 0.52 $422m 
Cornwall 
Resource 
Corporation 
NL 
Gold 95% $8m $9m 2.98 0.25 $8m 
Portman 
Mining Ltd 
Coal and 
iron ore 
97% $32m $109m  0.41 0.20 $56m 
Ticor Ltd Mineral 
sands and 
coal 
97% $76m $613m  0.50 0.43 $82m 
Victoria 
Petroleum NL 
Oil & gas 71% $18m $12m  0.10 0.05 $6m 
Washington 
H. Soul 
Pattinson & 
Co. Ltd 
Coal 10% $445m $881m  0.36 0.34 $47m 
*Estimate. 
 
In addition, the mean assets of the entire sample of 128 firms are $926.36 million 
and the median, $105.02 million. Leverage is calculated as total liabilities over total 
assets.  The median leverage for the entire sample is 0.3408. The following table 
shows leverage and size for the groups of firms that recognize reserve values and 
those that do not.    
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Table 3 
A comparison of leverage and size for the firms 
that recognize reserve values and those that do not 
 
Variable 
 
No. of 
Firms 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
Min.  
 
Max. 
 
Firms that recognize 
reserve values: 
      
Leverage 6 0.2995 0.2975 0.1671 0.0519 0.5179
Total Assets $m. 6 1466.17 361.00 281.88 8.93 7173.7
 
Firms that do not 
recognize reserve 
values: 
      
Leverage 122 0.4755 0.3409 0.8684 0.0082 8.4024
Total Assets $m. 122 899.81 100.17 343.51 1.37 3028.7
 
Firms in the Entire 
Sample: 
      
Leverage 128 0.4672 0.3408 0.8491 0.0082 8.4024
Total Assets $m. 128 926.36 105.02 340.14 1.37 3028.7
 
In addition, out of the sample of 128 producer firms, 93 (73%) disclosed reserves’ 
quantity estimates.  Of those 93 firms, 88 disclosed reserve quantity only, 5 
recognized reserve value also.  One firm that recognized value, did not disclose 
quantity.  Therefore, the number of reserve value recognizers totals 6. 
 
The following table shows the results of the t-test for leverage and size for the two 
groups of firms, i.e., the one that recognises reserve values in their books and the one 
that does not. 
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Table 4 
Results of t-Test* for the Groups of firms  
that recognize reserve values and those that do not 
 Leverage Size 
t Stat -1.6905 0.4751 
df 25 6 
P ( T<=t ) two-tail 0.1034 0.6515 
*t-Test: Two-sample assuming unequal variances 
 
Tables 2 to 4 above indicate that there is nothing systematic between the profiles of 
the recognizing firms and the rest of the industry.  Even this small sample of six 
includes firms producing a diversity of products, with substantial variance in 
proportion of revenues derived from extractive activities, size, leverage and reserves. 
 Statistical tests (t tests) confirmed that the differences between the recognizers and 
the rest of the sample are not significant.  
 
 
In the rest of this section, we outline the revaluation activity of each of the six firms 
that recognize reserve values and report on interviews with a financial executive of 
each firm1.  The interviews were directed toward ascertaining why these particular 
firms opted to recognize the value of reserves given that the substantial majority of 
extractive industry firms choose not to do so. 
 
  
 (a) CSR Limited 
 
CSR is a large diversified firm that was substantially involved in coal, oil and gas, 
iron, tin and gold but has recently divested these activities.   In 1995 the firm had an 
interest in quarrying and a 21% interest in a bauxite mine.  In the notes to the 1995 
accounts an item “Quarrying and other raw material reserves” is shown at $422 
million, including a directors’ valuation of $147 million.  In an interview with a 
                                                 
1 We initially interviewed three firms that did not recognize values; however these interviews were not 
productive.  Representatives were bemused as to why we were asking them why they did not recognize values as 
they thought that no firms in the industry did recognize values. 
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representative of the firm, it was explained that the firm shows “reserves at cost 
initially, but subsequently writes them up or down to reflect value”.  In 1995, the 
quarry, sand and claypit assets were revalued downward.  In 1992, the company 
undertook a “global” revaluation of all types of mineral reserves and took a net 
credit to asset revaluation reserve.  The credit was net of a downward revaluation of 
quarrying assets.  Discounted cash flow techniques were used to undertake the 
revaluation.   
 
Why might the firm have undertaken these actions?  Notably, CSR is relatively 
highly levered compared to other firms in our sample of producers.  Table 2 shows 
that CSR in 1995 had reported leverage of 0.52 compared to the overall median 
leverage in the sample of 0.34.  Consistent with the statements of the executive 
interviewed, the firm is plausibly revaluing for debt contract related reasons or to 
signal “true leverage” to the market.  However, this reason is not robust across the 
sample, as other producers also have high reported leverage yet do not opt to 
revalue. 
 
 
(b)  Cornwall Resource Corporation N.L. 
 
Cornwall is a small gold producer with assets of only $8.93 million.  The firm is also 
involved in gold exploration and development and strategic investments in other 
resource oriented activities.  In its 1995 year annual report, the firm shows “Gold 
and mineral exploration interests at Directors’ 1995/1994 valuation” at $8.17 
million; $4.87 million of this amount is attributed to exploration and $3.30 million to 
development. The footnote states: 
 
The Directors’ 1995 and 1994 valuations of exploration interests were 
based on detailed geological reviews of the economic entity’s 
production and exploration interests, taking into account proven 
reserves, future cash flows and recent market trends and transactions. 
 
In arriving at the value of exploration interests, the Directors have 
satisfied themselves that the value of these non current assets is not 
shown in the books at an amount greater than would have to be 
reasonably incurred in acquiring these assets pursuant to S294(4) of the 
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Corporations Law (p. 22). 
 
At note 18, the asset revaluation reserve account remains unchanged from previous 
year’s (1994) balance of $3,374,923.  However, the revaluation of non-current 
assets, including mineral reserves, is carried out in the 1993 accounts. The firm’s 
representative interviewed stated:  
 
When we decide that there is a mineable resource, we capitalize the 
exploration and development costs. The value of around $8 million 
represents a mixture of  the capitalized exploration and development 
costs and the value of mineral reserves.  In 1995 the increase in the 
“Non-current assets - other” represents the capitalized exploration and 
development costs.  Earlier [In 1994], we did value mineral reserves to 
show the fair market value of the tenements.  In 1997, we used an 
independent valuer who employed the net present value method to value 
reserves [Emphasis added]. 
 
 
Cornwall has total assets of $8,930,185 including the reserve values and total 
liabilities amounting to $2,266,020.  If the aggregate of capitalized exploration and 
development costs and reserves’ value is excluded from assets, the firm’s leverage 
ratio jumps from 0.25 to 2.98.  Again, as in the case of CSR, the firm is likely to be 
recognizing mineral reserves’ value to show its “true” leverage although it is again 
not obvious how the contracting or other costs of Cornwall (and CSR) differ from 
other high leverage firms that choose to not revalue. 
 
 
 (c) Portman Mining Limited 
 
Portman is a small coal and iron ore producer.  In 1995 the firm revalued its asset 
“Investment in mining ventures” to $27.74 million (note 10) through a credit to asset 
revaluation reserve.  However, the revaluation was not directly a revaluation of 
reserves, instead it was a revaluation of “mine properties and development 
properties”.  An interview with a company representative indicated that the 
revaluation was essentially a revaluation of reserves, as this value is the primary 
determinant of the value of the related properties.  This illustrates a further 
complexity of the revaluation of reserves issue.  In other words, to what extent can a 
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revaluation of mine properties be independent of the value of reserves?   Unless the 
mine is in an area where the properties have high value in alternative uses, a 
revaluation of properties is effectively a revaluation of reserves. 
 
The interviewee also indicated that it was not normal policy for the firm to carry out 
such revaluations, with the purpose of this particular revaluation “due to the 
impending sale of a share in the coal joint venture.” It appears that the transaction 
costs of the sale were reduced by recognizing a revaluation in the financial 
statements.   Furthermore, Portman reported advance sales of coal in its notes, 
perhaps also suggesting that the credibility of the revaluation could be relatively 
easily justified. 
 
 
(d) Ticor Limited 
 
Ticor is a medium sized firm (assets of $613 million) that produces mineral sands 
and coal.  The firm revalued all its mining tenements in 1994, although the note to 
the 1995 accounts indicated that this was not part of a regular revaluation of mining 
tenements.  The company representative interviewed explained that the company 
purchased the tenements in 1990 and brought them onto the balance sheet at 
valuation rather than at acquisition cost.  Independent valuers performed the 
valuation of the reserves.  Further disclosures in the annual report indicated that 
Ticor had sold all of the production from one mine in advance and asserted that there 
was a strong market for the coal from its other mine also.  Why did the company 
incur the cost of the valuation?  It is notable that the firm has relatively high leverage 
(0.43 compared to the sample leverage of 0.34); hence again the debt contract / 
signalling of leverage motivations are likely to have been operating. 
 
 
 (e) Victoria Petroleum N.L.   
 
Victoria Petroleum is a small oil and gas producer.  The balance sheet for 1995 
shows “Petroleum properties and lease and well equipment” at directors’ valuation 
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of $5.99 million.  An interview with a company representative concluded that this 
asset includes oil and gas reserves.  When asked why the reserves values are 
disclosed by the firm, it was stated that this is to “provide relevant information to 
shareholders”.  It was also indicated that the firm’s auditors “encourage” reserves’ 
value disclosures and “go through” the estimates with the firm.  
 
The latter comment could indicate that the (non) recognition practice could be 
auditor driven.  Indeed, some empirical studies of accounting choices include 
“auditor effects” although in this case why the type of auditor might correlate with 
reserve accounting policy is not obvious.   Furthermore, the effect is unlikely to be 
driven by size (usually used as a proxy for quality) because of the six firms 
recognizing values, three used “Big 6” auditors, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, KPMG, 
and Arthur Andersen, and three did not. The latter three firms employed “non-Big 
6”auditors, Grant Thornton, Duesburys, and Ruwald and Evans. All six firms were 
asked about the auditors’ reaction to their revaluation policy and none indicated any 
“problems with their auditor”. We did a test of the association of quality auditor and 
the firms’ policies regarding recognition of reserve values. The result indicates that 
the difference between the firms that recognize reserve values and those that do not, 
is not significant. 
 
 
(f) Washington H. Soul Pattinson & Co. Limited   
 
Washington H. Soul Pattinson is a medium size diversified firm that is involved in 
properties, commercial television, pharmaceuticals, and food processing, besides 
coal mining.  Note 9 to the 1995 accounts describes a revaluation of coal reserves 
undertaken by a subsidiary,  New Hope Corporation Ltd. The representative of the 
firm who was interviewed stated the following: 
 
We include value of “measured reserves”  in the books.  The value is 
based on internal and independent valuation of the Australian 
operations, Indonesian operations are excluded. We bring reserves’ 
value on to the books to make the balance sheet look more realistic, to 
inform shareholders, and to protect the firm from possible take-over 
activity.  In order to make the balance sheet look more meaningful and 
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to discourage take-over activity, the management looks at the assets and 
shows their value.  Mining leases are valued for their future potential. 
Our auditors are not opposed to reserves’ value recognition, but are 
comfortable with this policy. Later this year, new areas would be 
revalued as we revalue every three years.  The 1994 revaluation was 
actually based on revaluations of 1980’s.  At that time, we looked at all 
fixed assets. 
  
 
Of the six firms discussed here, Washington H. Soul Pattinson is the only one that 
recognizes reserves’ value but at the same time does not disclose quantity estimates. 
 
 
4. Why do some firms recognize values, but most do not? 
 
Our interviews and analysis of the relevant literature and financial reports indicate 
four reasons why so few firms recognize reserve values on balance sheets the first 
two of which are likely to be the most important.  First, the literature suggests that 
firms are more inclined to disclose bad rather than good news (Skinner, 1994).  
Threats of litigation cause firms to be reluctant to revalue assets unless they are 
relatively certain that the amounts recognized do not overstate value.   
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This is likely to be the case because the Corporations Law Sections 294 (2), 294 
(3)2, 1309 (1) and 1309 (2) explicitly require managers to ensure that assets are not 
overstated. In regard to reserves, typically there is material uncertainty over the 
value of the reserve, indeed this is commonly believed to be the major reason for 
reserve recognition accounting to be abandoned in the U.S. (Adkerson, 1979).  
Similarly, Easton, Eddey and Harris (1993) report a series of interviews about 
motivations for revaluations with representatives of firms across a number of 
industries. Some of these were producers in the extractive industries who stated that 
such uncertainty caused them to not revalue reserves.  Why does uncertainty have 
such an effect?  The reason is that the costs to managers of inaccuracies in financial 
statements are asymmetric.  The litigation costs of an over-estimate are higher than 
the costs of an underestimate (see Skinner 1994). 
 
Second, the accounting choice literature has for some time recognized political costs 
as a determinant of accounting technique decisions.   In particular, a number of 
papers have argued that firms in the Australian extractive industries are politically 
cost sensitive (for example, Sidhu and Whittred, 1996 and Walker, 1997).  It is 
likely that disclosure of reserves’ values would attract attention from bureaucrats 
and politicians looking for sources of taxation, as well as trade unions trying to 
increase salaries and other benefits to their members. In order to mitigate such costs 
firms are likely to decide to neither disclose nor recognize reserve  values.   
 
Third, the structure of the Australian revaluations (AASB 1010) rule preventing the 
credit  ever getting to income is perhaps a disincentive to recognize reserves. 
However, the associated reluctance to disclose reserve values by way of note or in 
some other way suggests that this is not the major reason for management 
reluctance.  Finally, Verrecchia (1990) and others have shown that proprietary costs 
can be a disincentive to disclose information.  In other words, the value of 
shareholders’ claims will be reduced if disclosures can be acted on by competitors of 
                                                 
2 Sections 294 (2) and 294 (3) of Corporations Law have now been repealed effective 1 July 1998.  
However, this does not affect the conclusions about our sample period of 1995.  Further, sections 
1309 (1) and 1309 (2) still apply. An officer of a corporation who makes available or furnishes 
information that is false or misleading is guilty of an offence. 
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the firm.  Although a high proportion of firms in the industry regularly disclose 
reserves’ quantities (Mirza, 1996, and Craswell and Taylor, 1992), this does not 
preclude proprietary costs being a factor.  Price information and geological 
occurrence are likely to be well known, but extraction costs may well be proprietary 
information that would be signalled if reserve values are recognized.  
 
But why do some do it?   Our case studies suggest a number of reasons why some 
(albeit relatively few) are willing to account for reserves at value.  First, consistent 
with the literature on the motivations for revaluations generally (Whittred and Chan, 
1992; Brown, Izan and Loh, 1992 and Cotter and Zimmer, 1995) in some cases the 
cost of debt can be lowered by the mitigating effect that a revaluation has on high 
reported leverage.  Second, but related to the first factor, firms are likely to consider 
the discretionary upward revaluation of certain reserves to offset the mandated 
write-down of other reserves to recoverable amount.  The latter appears to have been 
the situation with CSR. 
 
Third, in some cases management is relatively certain of the value of the reserves.  
In such situations the expected costs associated with uncertainty over reserve values 
are reduced to become smaller than the expected benefits of reducing the 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders over the value of the 
reserves.  This is demonstrated by the Portman Mining case where an impending 
market transaction (the sale of an interest in a relevant joint venture) apparently 
reduced uncertainty over the value of the reserve.  Similar comments apply to Ticor. 
 
Finally, the literature on takeovers in Australia (Trotman 1981) proposes that 
revaluation is a regular takeover defence through its alleged positive effect on share 
prices.  This is confirmed in our interviews by the representative of Washington H. 
Soul Pattinson, who volunteered that revaluations of reserves are regularly 
recognized as a takeover deterrent. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
  
16 
 
 
We argue that managers are likely to have an incentive to maximise the value of 
their firm.  In the case of firms in the extractive industries, the value of mineral 
reserves has information content. The primary determinant of the value of a minerals 
or oil and gas producer is the value of the reserves that the firm controls. Hence, one 
might expect that managers acting to maximize the value of the firm would try to 
account for the value of reserves in a credible way.  
 
A large majority of firms do not recognize reserve values in their books. A major 
reason for a general reluctance to recognize the values is that the firms are hindered 
by accounting rules. Other reasons for this reluctance are likely to be the firms’ 
political costs and proprietary costs.  
 
We find that the firms that do recognize reserve values have a high leverage. It is 
likely that the firms can lower their cost of debt by recognizing reserves. From the 
small number of firms that do recognize values, this appears to be a major reason. In 
addition to this, firms are likely to recognize reserves as a defence against takeovers.  
 
If regulators desire to reduce the difference between market and book value of 
shares of firms in the resources sector through communication of reserves’ values, 
they need to address two problems. First, they need to consider how to reduce the 
costs of management uncertainty over reserve values. Second, they need to consider 
how to reduce the political costs of disclosure. Mitigation of these two costs of 
disclosure and regulation is not easy.  Even so, the accounting regulators are likely 
to consider the task beyond their ambit.  
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